

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- ☐ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S (C)  
 Authority: HR 10-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest  
 Date 27 JAN 81 Reviewer 01855T

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Special Assistant, Intelligence Processes the Following Changes:

(SN-39)

Page 2, Para II, A, 4:

"4. In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will almost certainly attempt to follow the foreign and domestic policies established during recent years. It will probably continue to emphasize unwavering hostility to the West (including the tactic of splitting the West), the enlargement of the Bloc economic base, and the increase of Bloc military power."

Page 3, Para 5:

"5. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his foreign policy. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet regime will have Stalin's skill in avoiding general war. At least initially, the regime will also lack his freedom of action and his ability to maneuver, since it will not possess Stalin's immense prestige and authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the new regime will probably find it more difficult to <sup>resolve new issues & to</sup> abandon positions than did Stalin and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly to what it regarded as if new aggressive moves of the West confronted it with the need for major decisions. Conversely, the new leadership will <sup>in the near future</sup> probably exercise caution in taking action which it thought would force the West to make comparable decisions. ...."

-2-

Page 4, Para 8:

"8. For some time, no successor to Stalin will be able to achieve comparable status or similar significance as a symbol of the international Communist movement and as the undisputed leader of world Communism. ~~Therefore~~ However, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc may is not likely to be impaired, at least temporarily. If, on the other hand there should be a struggle for power should develop within the Soviet Communist Party, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc would almost certainly be weakened."

Page 6, Para 13:

"13. We believe that in general the Western European leaders will be disposed for the time being to conduct the East-West struggle with greater hesitancy and caution. They will probably fear that any ~~immediate~~ new Western pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger of war and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the USSR. They will also probably hope that, if new Western pressure is not exerted, the problems involved in the consolidation of the authority of the new regime of the USSR will bring about at least a temporary relaxation of tensions and enable them to postpone disagreeable policy decisions."

9507